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There is a limit to the extent of country
 which can advantageously be governed,
 or even whose government can be conveniently
 superintended, from a single centre.
John Stuart Mill, 1861
I.  Introduction
A number of economists and political scientists have been concerned with the normative question
of an optimally designed federalist constitution. In addition to arguments for a vertical separation
of powers, brought forward by Montesquieu and de Tocqueville, James Madison already empha-
sized that a decentralized provision of public services best helps satisfying different needs arising
from local or regional particularities: In Federalist 10, he contended that “the great and aggregate
interests being referred to the national, the local and in particular to the State legislatures”
(HAMILTON, MADISON and JAY, 1787/88, p. 83). OATES (1972, p. 11) argues that decentralization
is appropriate if residents in different sub-federal jurisdictions have different tastes for public
services. A uniform provision of the service at the federal level would leave both worse off, the
residents who want more of a public good and the residents who want less of a public good. Con-
sequently, he proposes his Decentralization Theorem as a guideline for the distribution of fiscal
competencies among different tiers of government: In the absence of inter-jurisdictional exter-
nalities and economies of scale in the provision of public services, decentralization of govern-
ment activities is preferable.
A large body of literature has followed the normative theory of fiscal federalism developing con-
ditions under which centralization of government activities or coordination among sub-federal
governments should be undertaken. Interregional externalities in the form of cost or benefit spill-– 3 –
overs provide arguments for coordination activities.  Tax competition creates fiscal externalities
between jurisdictions and provide reasons for centralization (WILSON and WILDASIN, 2004). In
addition, economies of scale in the consumption of public services can be exploited by a central-
ized provision. With respect to income redistribution, centralization may be useful to circumvent
income segregation between sub-federal jurisdictions. Finally, macroeconomic stabilization can
be provided more effectively at the federal level. However, there are also theoretical arguments
against each of these reasons for centralization. For example, fiscal and regional externalities may
offset each other (SØRENSEN, 2004). Internalization of externalities can be reached by voluntary
transfers between jurisdictions (MYERS, 1990). Therefore, the normative question to what extent
government services and tasks should be de-centralized is still disputed.
1
BESLEY and COATE (2003) challenge this welfare theoretical approach: In a framework of be-
nevolent governments taking different preferences in different jurisdictions into account, a cen-
tralized system  is as well able to allocate different levels of public goods to different districts
financed by general taxation as sub-federal  governments. But unlike a decentralized decision-
making process the centralized provision accompanied by decentralized administration can inter-
nalize cross-border externalities. Therefore, according to BESLEY and COATE (2003) the rationale
of decentralization must be explained by political economy considerations. In their framework,
locally provided public goods are chosen by locally elected representatives. They therefore have
incentives to equate the marginal benefits from the public good with the marginal costs of public
funds. In a centralized system, the level of local public goods is decided by the federal legislature
consisting of elected representatives from each district. This leads to a common pool problem of
                                                                
1 The literature on the normative theory of fiscal federalism is large and still expanding. A brief summary of the
basic arguments is provided by FELD and SCHNEIDER (2001) while the classic articles on fiscal federalism are
collected in OATES (1998).– 4 –
the centralized budget: Each representative fully internalizes the benefit of the public good pro-
vided to his own district, but as financing is shared through general taxes he internalizes only a
fraction of the marginal costs of public funds. Concentration of benefits and dispersion of costs
lead to an overspending problem.
2 Thus, the constitutional decision for or against centralizing
public goods entails a trade-off between the benefits of internalizing regional externalities and the
costs of a common pool problem that can best be solved by fiscal federalism.
Following WEINGAST, SHEPSLE and JOHNSON (1981), it can be argued that state and local poli-
cymakers have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to provide their constitu-
ency with geographically targeted public goods financing them nationally with general taxes. The
common-pool problem is then aggravated by vote trading between policymakers of different ju-
risdictions (‘I’ll scratch your back, you’ll scratch mine’). Although federalist systems may be
desirable, they are therefore inherently unstable and subject to secular trends towards centraliza-
tion. This point is already mentioned by RIKER (1964) and is empirically illustrated by  VAUBEL
(1994).  BRENNAN and  BUCHANAN (1980) argue that the mentioned incentives for collusive
agreements among politicians at the sub-federal level weaken the competitive pressure of fiscal
federalism and accordingly represent a major problem of a federalist constitution.  Therefore,
from a normative point of view, it is important to find out how different constitutional provisions
shape the degree of policy centralization in a polity.
                                                                
2 The analysis by LOCKWOOD (2002) is similar to BESLEY and COATE’s (2003) model. PERSSON and TABELLINI
(1994) also use a political economy analysis to show the importance of decentralization in restricting government
discretion. See also ALESINA and SPOLAORE (1997),  BOLTON and ROLAND (1997),  INMAN and RUBINFELD
(1997), PERSSON and TABELLINI (2000), and TOMMASI and WEINSCHELBAUM (2003).– 5 –
However, little attention has been given to the empirical question whether different degrees of
government centralization can be explained by institutional differences among jurisdictions.
WALLIS and OATES (1988) explore the process of government centralization for U.S. state and
local governments from 1902 to 1982. They investigate various hypotheses concerning fiscal
federalism but do not include a political economy explanation of centralization. STRUMPF and
OBERHOLZER-GEE (2002) for the U.S. states as well as CERNIGLIA (2003) for a sample of OECD
countries present evidence that preference heterogeneity more likely induces policy decentraliza-
tion. Again, constitutional differences are not considered by these authors. In a further study,
BAKER (2000) takes a top-down perspective on centralization by concentrating on the impact of
central authorities’ veto power. According to his results of a cross section of U.S. states in 1987,
governors in the states use enhanced veto authority to attract local spending responsibilities to the
state level. VAUBEL (1996) analyzes the impact of legal and constitutional restrictions on gov-
ernment centralization for a cross-section of about 50 countries in the early nineties and finds that
the independence of the highest courts and their age significantly reduce centralization.
BLANKART (2000) argues in a comparative case study of Germany and Switzerland that institu-
tional differences between both countries, in particular the extent of direct democracy, explains
the different centralization outcomes. He does however not provide any econometric evidence. In
a convincing study, PANIZZA (1999) presents evidence that in about 60 countries a higher level of
democracy is associated with less centralized government activity.
3  GARRETT and  RODDEN
(2003) corroborate these results for a panel of 47 states and the period 1978-1997. In addition,
their results indicate that more open economies have more fiscal centralization. However, the
democracy index used by PANIZZA or GARRETT and RODDEN is not sufficiently differentiated and
does not distinguish the impacts of specific constitutional provisions on policy centralization.
                                                                
3 For an earlier study along these lines see POMMEREHNE and KIRCHGÄSSNER (1976).– 6 –
The purpose of this paper is to examine different degrees of centralization in representative and
direct democratic regimes and thus contribute to the question whether different constitutional
provisions shape policy centralization. We develop a theoretical model that is in the spirit of
BESLEY and COATE (2003) and show that referendums induce more decentralized provision and
financing of public services. The intuition is simple: If spillovers of public goods between two
jurisdictions exist and individual preferences in the jurisdictions are sufficiently homogeneous,
citizens have incentives to centralize policies. Compared to elected representatives, they are how-
ever more reluctant to delegate competencies to the central level. With representative democracy
and cooperative decision-making on the central level, the common pool problem emerges and
gives representatives leeway to extract political rents. This is anticipated by  voters. With direct
democratic institutions on the central level, implying non-cooperative decision-making, voters
face additional uncertainty, ex ante not knowing precisely which position the median voter will
have in the newly shaped electorate. In a representative system, the uncertainty about the out-
come of the centralized political process can be reduced, for instance by gerrymandering. Both
arguments together imply that centralization is more likely to be agreed upon by local represen-
tatives compared to local median voters.
In a related paper, REDOANO and SCHARF (2004) analyze policy centralization among two het-
erogeneous regions. They argue that, even if centralization is preferable to internalize cross-
border spillovers, a referendum may prevent centralization. In the presence of a referendum, gov-
ernment policies are not harmonized whenever preferences for public goods’ provision differ
sufficiently among both regions. The pivotal voter in the jurisdiction that gains from benefit
spillovers will not accept the centralization proposal in the referendum. Delegating decision-
making power to elected representatives however helps the regions to obtain centralization be-
cause delegating the harmonization choice commits the pro-centralization jurisdiction to motivate– 7 –
the other jurisdiction to cooperate. In contrast to our model, Redoano and Scharf do not consider
that representatives might extract political rents. In addition, they assume preference heterogene-
ity in the different jurisdictions.
4
We test the hypothesis that referendums lead to less centralization with panel data from the 26
Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 with an econometric model capturing federalist organization
and including standard controls. Our empirical investigation supports the view that popular refer-
endums restrict government centralization. We find that fiscal referendums are associated with a
significantly lower level of spending and revenue centralization. This does not only hold for total
spending and revenue, but also for spending, revenue and tax structure. Thus, our paper also con-
tributes to the empirical literature on the political economy of direct legislation. Several studies
have investigated the effect of direct democratic institutions on the performance of governments
(see the reviews by FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER, 2000, KIRCHGÄSSNER, FELD and SAVIOZ, 1999,
MATSUSAKA, 2002). A common finding is that institutions of direct democracy matter for gov-
ernment behavior. But to our knowledge, there is no empirical study investigating the effect of
fiscal referendums on government centralization.
5
                                                                
4 See also the papers by CRÉMER and PALFREY (1996) and LOCKWOOD (2004). Crémer and Palfrey are not con-
cerned with the benefits of centralization in a world of regional externalities. They study whether centralization
will more probably occur under aggregation of votes at the national (unitary referendum) or the district levels
(sub-federal referendum). Lockwood studies the assignment of competencies under unitary and federal referen-
dums by considering economies of scale as a benefit and political inefficiencies as a cost of central provision.
Under certain conditions, he shows that both kinds of referendums may be efficient.
5 MATSUSAKA (2002) distinguishes between state and local revenue and spending in his study for the U.S., but he
does not explicitly analyze centralization.– 8 –
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we present our theoretical model on the impact
of referendums on government centralization. In Section III we present some anecdotal evidence
how referendums reduce the extent of centralization. In Section IV, stylized facts of Swiss insti-
tutions are summarized to motivate the empirical analysis. The empirical investigation appears in
Section V followed by a discussion of the results in Section VI. We offer some concluding re-
marks in Section VII.
II.  A Political Economy Model of Centralization and Referendums
1.  Infrastructure of the model
In order to show that centralization of public goods provision is more likely under representative
than direct-democratic political institutions, we use a model with two regions where different
local public goods are provided and inter-jurisdictional utility spillovers occur. Suppose that,
partially resembling the specifications of  BESLEY and COATE  (2003) and  DUR and  ROELFSMA
(2002), an individual I in one of the regions  2 , 1 , ˛ j i  with  j i „ has the utility function
( ) ( ) [ ] j i
I I
i g b g b x U g l + + = (1)
where x is the amount of private goods consumed,  g  is the quantity of a local public good,
1 0 £ <g  is a spillover parameter indicating, for instance, geographical proximity between the
two regions and  () ￿ b  is a strictly concave, increasing valuation function for public goods.
To simplify, we assume that the parameter l denotes the preferences for public goods and is dis-
tributed over an interval  ( ] l , O  such that the median preference is identical in both regions,




i l l  Furthermore, let the public good preferences of political representatives be distrib-
uted over the same interval so that, if a representative is drawn randomly, her expected public– 9 –
goods’ preference is  ( ) . 1 = E
r l  Both regions are inhabited by an equal number of  n individuals.
Also, the technologies of public goods’ provision are identical in both regions and public goods
are financed by lump sum taxes such that each individual has to give up one unit of the private
good in order to allow for the provision of one unit of a local public good. In other words, regions
are completely identical as far as the technicalities of public good provision are concerned, with
the only qualification that the kinds of local public goods differ. Therefore, the main difference
between our model and, e.g., BESLEY and COATE (2003), is that the latter captures a greater deal
of complexity by integrating multiple sources of regional heterogeneity – the types of local public
goods, different values of l  over and within the regions – while we focus only on one source of
diversity.
Finally, we assume that a representative who is in office can secure a rent from every unit of a
local public good that is supplied under his legislation. Thus, while a representative formally has
to pay the same lump-sum tax as every other citizen, his effective contribution is only  i g s  with
1 0 < <s  (i.e., he secures a rent of  ) 1 ( s -  per unit of public goods).
2.  Three regimes of public good provision
Regarding the political institutions of public goods’ provision, three different regimes are distin-
guished.
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which leads to the first order condition of  1 / ) ( = ¶ ¶ i i g g b  for an optimal 
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where  ( ) ( ) [ ] j i
r r
i g b g b x U g l + + =  which leads to the first order condition of  ( )
r
i i g g b l s / / = ¶ ¶
for an optimal  .
Dr
i g  A median voter endowed with perfect knowledge would thus choose a repre-
sentative with a preference for public goods  . s l =
r  Without credible signaling mechanisms for
the representatives’ true public goods’ preferences, however, the expected true value of
( ) . 1 =
r r E is l l  In this case, representative democracy is associated with expected overspending,
the actual extent of which will depend on influences not formally considered here, such as the
likelihood for ex post punishment via retrospective voting. If, on the other hand, a fiscal referen-
dum is obligatory or can be organized at sufficiently low cost, overspending will be avoided.
Centralized, cooperative public good provision. To analyze this institutional framework, we
assume, closely related to  WEINGAST (1979), that both elected representatives express their
wishes for the level of public goods in their own jurisdiction and engage in pork-barrel politics
thereafter. Also, a simple cost-sharing rule is assumed, which states that the total costs of public
good provision are divided equally between both jurisdictions. Each representative then solves


















j g g =  Letting the median voter in each jurisdiction decide about which public good levels she
would prefer under this regime of cost sharing would, on the other hand, lead to the first order– 11 –
conditions  ( ) 2 / 1 / = ¶ ¶ i i g g b  and  ( ) . 2 / 1 / g = ¶ ¶ j j g g b Measured against the median preferences, a
collusive agreement between regional representatives would therefore always lead to overspend-
ing, even if  , 1 = s  as long as spillovers are not complete and  . 1 < g
Centralized, non-cooperative public good provision. Suppose that, while the cost-sharing rule
from the cooperative regime remains the same, the spending levels are not decided upon by col-
lusive agreement between representatives, but that decision-making power is delegated to cen-
tralized institutions of collective decision-making. Suppose further that, on the central level, a
decision is made between a spending proposal drafted in i and a spending proposal drafted in  . j
Then,  p  denotes the probability that a proposal from  i is chosen at the central level, and corre-
spondingly,  ( ) p - 1  is the probability of choice for the proposal form  . j  The uncertainty about
the outcome of the centralized decision will usually have multiple reasons: voter turnout may be
different across jurisdictions, in a representative system constituencies may be shaped to influ-
ence the result in a certain direction and so on.
If a non-cooperative spending proposal is passed by a referendum, the median voter on the local
level will choose















with the first order conditions being  ( ) 2 / 1 / = ¶ ¶ i i g g b  and  ( ) . 2 / 1 / g = ¶ ¶ j j g g b  If, on the other
hand, a non-cooperative spending proposal is drafted by a representative, his choice will be

















yielding as first order conditions  ( ) 2 / / s = ¶ ¶ i i g g b  and  ( ) . 2 / / g s = ¶ ¶ j j g g b
3.  Pathways to a centralization of spending competencies
Centralization via referendum. Presuming that the status quo is a decentralized setting and that
we are interested in processes of centralization, the interesting question is to see under which
conditions the electorate or representatives are inclined to agree to a centralization of public
spending. Comparing the median voter’s utility under a decentralized, direct democratic regime
with that under a cooperatively centralized regime, it is easy to see that centralization will be pre-
ferred if
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i g g =  we can note
Lemma 1. If s  is sufficiently large to ensure that the left hand side of (8) is not smaller than ½,
then there always exists a  1 1 £
















g b g b
(8)
and the median voter prefers cooperatively centralized over decentralized provision of public
goods.
Proof. Eq. (8) follows immediately from (7). From our first order conditions, it follows that the
slope of  () ￿ b  at 
Dm
i g  equals unity, while it equals  , 2 / 1 2 / £ s  at  .
C
i g  The left hand side of (8)
displays the slope of the secant that runs through 
C
i g  and  .
Dm
i g  Therefore, and due to the concav-
ity of  (), ￿ b  the value of the left hand side has to be strictly smaller than unity and larger than– 13 –
. 2 / s  For very small values of s , the slope of the secant may be smaller than the right hand side
of (8) even for  . 1 = g  Thus, centralization will only be favored if the rents appropriated by the
representatives are sufficiently small and the spillovers are sufficiently large.
If the decentralized, direct-democratic regime competes against a non-cooperative, centralized
regime with direct-democratic decision-making over the spending proposals, non-cooperative
centralization will be preferred if
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i g g b g b - + > g (9)
Note that the costs are not state-dependent due to the symmetry assumption; the same amount
will be spent on public goods regardless of which spending proposal is implemented, but it will
be differently allocated across regions. Based upon this inequality, we can state
Lemma 2. For any  [ ], 1 , 0 ˛ p  there exists a  1 2 £
* g  that is sufficiently large to make non-
cooperative centralization preferred over decentralization for the median voter. For
, 1 = p  centralization is preferred for any  [ ]. 1 , 0 ˛ g
Proof. See Appendix A.
If  ( ) g v  denotes the expected benefits from centralization and  ( ) g w  denotes the expected extra
costs, then, as is shown in the proof of Lemma 2,  ( ) 1 w  and  ( ) 1 v  are independent of  , p  whereas
the curve of  ( ) 1 < g v  rotates to the southeast with declining  p  and may even become negative for
a combination of low values of  p  and  . g  In other words, the interval  [ ] 1 , 2
* g  where centralization
is preferred shrinks with a declining  . p  The obvious problem with centralization decisions is that
not both jurisdictions can have  1 » p  at the same time. If it is very likely that the proposal from  i– 14 –
succeeds on the central level, then it has to be very unlikely that the proposal from  j  succeeds.
From these considerations follows
Lemma 3. The interval  [ ] 1 , 2
* g  where both median voters favor non-cooperative centralization is
the largest, when  . 2 / 1 = p
Proof. It is obvious that the interval of consensual centralization is the largest, when both median
voters have the same threshold spillover level for favoring centralization. Given our symmetry
assumptions, this is the case at  . 2 / 1 = p
Centralization by consenting representatives. Decision-making on the centralization of
spending competencies is highly path-dependent. If budgetary decisions in the local jurisdictions
are subject to a popular referendum, it is usually not possible for representatives to decide upon
the centralization of spending decisions – the centralization decision itself would have to be le-
gitimized via a referendum. Thus, the status quo for centralization by consenting representatives
are local jurisdictions with representative decision-making – in other words, we assume that rep-
resentatives cannot on their own authority suspend local direct democracy by creating a central-
ized representative system. For a representative to favor cooperative centralization, it is then nec-
essary that
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2
(10)
Solving this inequality leads to
Lemma 4. There exists a level of rent extraction  [ ) 1 , 0 ˛ s  for which cooperative centralization
will be preferred by representatives for a level of spillovers  . 1 3
* * <g g  Contrary to direct democ-– 15 –
racy, decision-making by representatives also ensures that even with very high levels of rent ex-
traction, there is a spillover-level for which centralization is preferred.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If, on the other hand, non-cooperative centralization is to be attained,  s  is a rather unreliable
instrument to increase the range of spillovers for which centralization is preferred. The reason is
simple: Cooperative centralization via referendum involves a delegation of decision-making
powers to representatives on the central level; non-cooperative centralization involves no such
thing, because in this case, centralized decision-making remains subject to a popular referendum.
Even with a low  s , the threat of excessive spending under a centralized regime does not exist,
because a referendum is necessary. Due to the missing necessity of delegation, voters are less
reluctant to centralize in the non-cooperative case. If, for instance,  ( )
a g a g b ￿ =  with
1 0 , 0 < < > a a  is chosen as the specification for the valuation function, then  s  has no impact at
all on the value of  .
* g  For other specifications, such as  ( ) ( ), 1 ln g a g b ￿ + =  the effect of even
very high levels of rent extraction is diminutively small.
Nevertheless, even with s  not playing a role, centralization is more likely to occur under a rep-
resentative regime if under direct democratic centralization  . 2 / 1 „ p  It follows from Lemma 3
that the range of spillovers for which centralization is commonly preferred in both jurisdictions
will be maximized if  . 2 / 1 = p  There are, though, many reasons that may lead to unequal winning
probabilities for the two spending proposals: there may be differences in the culture of political
participation, the costs of getting to the ballots may be higher in a more rural compared to a more
urban jurisdiction and so on. In a direct democracy, where a majority of the entire electorate de-
cides, it is hardly feasible to shape formal political institutions in order to manipulate  . p  Under– 16 –
representative democracy, on the other hand, instruments to manipulate  p  are available such as
gerrymandering. If this is possible, then under representative democracy the range  [ ] 1 ,
* g  where
centralization is favored can be extended by finding formal political institutions for the central
level that ensure that  p  converges towards ½. These considerations, along with Lemmas 1-4,
lead to
Proposition 1. Representatives are more inclined to favor centralization of spending competen-
cies than voters in direct-democratic decision-making, since
(i)  under cooperative central decision-making, the prospect of additional rent-
extraction makes the centralized solution relatively more alluring to representa-
tives than to citizens and
(ii)  under non-cooperative central decision-making, a representative system allows
for the adjustment of  p  via the choice of appropriate formal institutions in the
case that  2 / 1 „ p  at the outset.
Obviously, the representatives’ tendency to centralize may be mitigated by influences not for-
mally considered here, such as the threat of punishment through retrospective voting. But since
direct democracy leads to tighter control of politicians compared to representative democracy
(see again the reviews by FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER, 2000, KIRCHGÄSSNER, FELD and SAVIOZ,
1999, MATSUSAKA, 2002), such mitigating influences do not principally threaten our result: Rep-
resentative democracy offers the necessary niches to centralize against the will of the median
voter, e.g. by centralizing at the beginning of a term and hoping for prospective or myopic voting
in the next elections, or by accompanying an unpopular centralizing decision with a popular deci-
sion elsewhere.– 17 –
III.  Anecdotal Evidence
There is indeed some anecdotal evidence supporting Proposition 1. As referendums on European
integration in Ireland and Denmark have shown, centralization is not easily accomplished in the
case it has to be decided in a referendum. In a referendum on joining the European Monetary
Union on September 28, 2000, the Danish people decided by a majority of 53.1 percent not to
become a member of EMU although it is a widely held belief that the de facto independence of
Danish monetary policy is very small. Danish voters obviously opposed a further centralization
of competencies to the EU level. Similarly, the Irish people rejected the Nice Treaty in a referen-
dum on June 7, 2001 by a majority of 53.9 percent. They may not have accepted this first time
that the Nice Treaty reduces the decision-making power of smaller EU member states in the
Council of Ministers. The Irish voters accepted a revised proposal afterwards.
Government centralization is also of practical relevance in Swiss politics, as two examples may
illustrate: the canton of Fribourg which accounts for 242 communes wants to reduce its number
of communes to 120 units by assisting communal mergers. The government officials argue that
the current communal structure is inefficient since one third of the communes account for less
than 1’000 inhabitants. In the sixties the cantonal parliament of Fribourg already passed a law to
encourage communal mergers. In a referendum on May 26, 1974, voters refused this law by 60
percent of the votes. Nevertheless, once more on October 12, 1999 the cantonal government of
Fribourg decided to subsidize communal mergers until 2004 with 4 Mio. SFr each year. After this
date, mergers of small communes should be enforced. Despite this incentive, the citizens oppose
these plans.
The same holds for the canton of Ticino. In 1998 the cantonal government presented a report ar-
guing that its 245 communes are too small to provide public services efficiently. According to– 18 –
this report, the number of communes would have to be reduced to 86 units in order to reach a so-
called ‘optimal’ communal size. However, in a communal poll two communes ( Lugaggia and
Sala Capriasca) refused the merger with 4 other communes. Another example is a recent proposal
on tax harmonization between all communes in the canton of Vaud. On June 10, 2001, voters
refused an initiative, which demanded a uniform tax rate for all 384 communes on the territory of
the canton of Vaud. These examples give a first clue that the popular referendum could have
some impact on restricting policy centralization among Swiss cantons.
IV.  Stylized Facts about Swiss Institutions
Indeed, Switzerland provides a natural laboratory to test Proposition 1. The power of the federal
government in Switzerland is very limited. Federal tasks have to be explicitly enumerated in the
federal constitution. Unlike in Germany, the Swiss constitution does not make use of a concurrent
legislation. Centralization of responsibilities has to be approved in a referendum requiring a dou-
ble majority of the Swiss citizens and of the cantonal electorates. In 2001, 32.6 percent of total
(federal, cantonal and local) spending was undertaken by the federal government, 40.7 percent by
the cantonal level and 26.6 percent by the local level. There are corresponding figures for public
revenue. The degree of spending and revenue centralization is accompanied by a respective deci-
sion-making power of the different government levels on spending and revenue policies. For ex-
ample, there doesn’t exist such a far-reaching tax sharing agreement between Swiss jurisdictions
as in Australia, Austria or Germany. Cantons and also local jurisdictions, though to a lower ex-
tent, have discretion on personal and corporate income tax rates (FELD and SCHNEIDER, 2001).
Similarly, cantons decide upon their infrastructure independently. Even social welfare is inde-
pendently determined by the local and state levels.– 19 –
As Appendix D illustrates, there is an additional variation of centralization from the local to the
state level in the different Swiss cantons. For total revenue and spending, it varies from roughly
50 percent in cantons like Zurich or Schwyz to essentially 100 percent in the canton of Basle-
City. The latter is an outlier in that respect, because cantonal and local spending are not properly
separated in the budget laws. The second most centralized canton is the canton of Uri. The degree
of centralization varies even more considerably for different revenue and spending categories.
While the average centralization of direct taxes with the exception of inheritance taxes appears to
be relatively homogeneous, average centralization of public spending categories is considerably
more heterogeneous. It ranges from 8 percent to 98 percent in the case of spending for culture
and recreation, but from 51 percent to 100 percent in the case of education spending  (Appendix
C).
Switzerland’s considerable autonomy at the state and local level is accompanied by a non-
negligible variation of institutions of direct democracy. Most cantons have some form of semi-
direct democracy with a parliamentary system with legislators elected according to a system of
proportional party representation. Only two rural cantons ( Appenzell-Innerrhoden (AI) and
Glarus (GL), see. Table 1) take political decisions in canton meetings (Landsgemeinde). On the
other hand, the cantons have different institutions of political participation rights (TRECHSEL and
SERDÜLT, 1999; FELD and MATSUSAKA, 2003). Proposals can be initiated by the voter initiative,
and new laws passed by the legislature are, to different degrees, subject to an optional or even a
mandatory popular referendum.– 20 –





optional mandatory optional mandatory
ZH
c 2-20 20 0.2-2 2 4
BE 2 – 0.4 – 5
LU 3-25 25 specific stipulations
d 4.25
UR 0.5 1 0.05 0.1 5
SZ – 0.25 – 0.05 4.38
OW 0.5 1 0.1 0.2 5
NW 0.25 5 0.05 0.5 5
GL – 0.5 – 0.1 4
ZG – 0.5 – 0.05 4
FR 0.25% 1% 0.25% 1% 2
SO 1-2 2 0.1-0.2 0.2 5
BS 1 – 0.2 – 4.25
BL 0.5 – 0.05 – 4.75
SH 0.3-1 0.3 0.05-0.1 0.05 4.5
AR – 5% – 1% 4
AI 0.25 0.5 0.05 0.1 3
SG 3.15 15 0.3-1.5 1.5 3.25
GR 1-5 5 0.3-0.5 0.5 4
AG 3 – 0.3 – 4.5
TG 1 3 0.2 0.6 4.5
TI 0.2 – 0.05 – 2.75
VD – – – – 3
VS 0.75% – 0.25% – 1
NE – 1.5% – 1.5% 1.5
GE 0.125 – 0.06 – 1
JU 0.5% 5% 0.05% 0.5% 2.5
Source: LUTZ, G. and D. STROHMANN (1998); FREY, B.S. and A. STUTZER (2000)
a The index is constructed by the signature requirement as the number of signatures relative to the number of voters,
by the legal time limit as the days within which the signatures have to be collected and by the financial threshold as
the per capita spending limit allowing for referendum (the values correspond to the year 1992).
b In 1'000'000 Swiss Francs
c The identification codes stand for the following cantons: Aargau (AG), Appenzell-Innerrhoden (AI), Appenzell-
Ausserrhoden (AR), Bern (BE),  Basel-Landschaft (BL),  Basel-Stadt (BS),  Fribourg (FR),  Genève (GE),  Glarus
(GL), Graubünden (GR), Jura (JU), Luzern (LU), Neuchâtel (NE), Nidwalden (NW), Obwalden (OW), Schaffhausen
(SH), Schwyz (SZ), St.Gallen (SG), Solothurn (SO), Thurgau (TG), Ticino (TI), Uri (UR), Vaud (VD), Valais (VS),
Zug (ZG), Zürich (ZH).
d In the case of recurring expenditures the total amount over all concerned budget periods is decisive.– 21 –
In the context of our analysis, the impact of fiscal referendums on policy decisions of sub-
national governments is of interest. There exists no fiscal referendum on the central level, but
with the exception of the canton of Vaud (VD)
6 all cantons know a derivative of the fiscal refer-
endum. Of the remaining 25 cantons, 13 have a mandatory as well as an optional fiscal referen-
dum. In seven other cantons (BE, BS, BL, AG, TI, VS, GE) only the optional fiscal referendum is
possible, whereas in SZ, GL, ZG, AR, NE budget resolutions have to pass the mandatory, but not
the optional fiscal referendum. The fiscal referendum can be differentiated according to five
categories: the fiscal referendum for public expenditures, for public-sector bonds, for taxes, for
holdings on enterprises and for purchases of real estate. In principle, there are threshold varia-
tions for non-recurring expenditures and for recurring expenditures. Five cantons (FR, AR, VS,
NE, JU) determine thresholds as a percentage of last budget’s expenditures. All others determine
a specific amount as the decisive threshold. The number of signatures required to qualify for
ballots and the time span within which the signatures have to be collected for the optional fiscal
referendum is also very diverse among cantons. It differs from 0.49 percent of signatures from all
voters in the canton of Obwalden (OW) compared to 4.28 percent of signatures in the canton of
Jura (JU). The time span for collecting the signatures varies from 30 days to 90 days among can-
tons with an optional fiscal referendum. Thus, the institutional variation on the Swiss sub-federal
level provides a laboratory to investigate the impact of fiscal referendums on government cen-
tralization.
V.  Empirical Model
In order to test Proposition 1, arguing that fiscal referendums are associated with a lower degree
of government centralization, we use a linear model that determines the share of cantonal expen-
                                                                
6 Laws that affect public spending are subject to an optional legislative referendum in the canton of Vaud (VD).– 22 –
diture and revenues (structure) from cantonal and local expenditure and revenues (structure). The
central level in our empirical model is therefore comprised of the cantons while the sub-central
level is represented by the local jurisdictions. The model can be written as follows
ESit = a1 + b1 Rit + g1 Tit + d1 Xit +e1it (11)
RSit = a2  + b2 Rit + g2 Tit + d2 Xit +e2it (12)
where ESit denotes the share of real cantonal expenditure (structure) in percent of total state and
local expenditure in equation (11) and RSit represents the respective real revenues (structure) in
equation (12). Rit is a vector of variables capturing direct democracy at the cantonal level, Tit is a
vector of different control variables measuring the extent of fiscal federalism, and Xit is a vector
of economic, demographic and political control variables. In addition, time fixed effects are in-
cluded in all equations. a, b, g, d are vector valued coefficients to be estimated while e represents
an error term (see Appendix B  for a definition of all variables). The unit of observation is the
cantonal level. We estimate the model using annual data over the period 1980 to 1998 deflated to
the year 1980. The subscript i = 1, ..., 26 indicates cantons and t = 1980, ..., 1998 indexes years
(see Appendix C for summary statistics).
As stated by OATES (1972) and PANIZZA (1999) the quantification of government centralization is
not an easy task. Cross-country comparisons of expenditure and revenue ratios on the federal
level could be an inaccurate measure of policy centralization due to the following problems: (i)
Different numbers of levels of sub-federal governments should be weighted differently. (ii) Local
spending and revenues do not necessarily reflect autonomy in spending and revenue decisions.
(iii) The existence of inter-governmental grants has an important effect on the incentive structure
of local decision-makers. Fortunately, our data base accounts for these problems and therefore– 23 –
has a major advantage compared to cross-country comparisons. First, all governments in our re-
gression have only one sub-ordinate level. Second, it may well be that centralization of public
finances does not exactly describe local autonomy and it would be better to have an indicator of
constitutional autonomy. However, the decision-making power granted to local jurisdictions by
the cantonal constitution or the laws is difficult to measure. In addition, the fiscal constitution of
Switzerland comes close to the principle of fiscal equivalence, implying  that people paying and
consuming public goods are also those who decide upon it (SCHALTEGGER and FREY, 2003).
Thus, the Swiss data on centralization of public finances should be a relatively good proxy for
centralization of competencies. Third, our data base allows to consider the impact of inter-
governmental grants in our analysis. A common problem of cross-country analyses stems from
the fact that social security programs are included in data for the total government but sometimes
not in data for the central government due to off-budget activities. Therefore, cross-country cen-
tralization ratios are likely to be underestimated for those countries, which have sizeable off-
budget activities. In our data base, the financing of national social security and national defense
are excluded for all governments. Thus, all in all we believe to have a useful proxy reflecting
government centralization.
7
To consider the institutional impact of fiscal referendums on government centralization we use a
dummy variable of mandatory cantonal fiscal referendums Rit. According to Proposition 1, this
variable should exhibit a negative sign. In addition the spending thresholds for mandatory fiscal
                                                                
7 An additional argument that is worth mentioning is concerned with a possible centralization to the federal level.
Indeed, economic and constitutional incentives to centralize government activities might also lead to a centrali-
zation from the cantonal to the federal level and not only from the local to the cantonal level. This effect is not
captured by the data used in this paper. It would be necessary to use cross country data that have their particular
shortcomings as well, as mentioned above.– 24 –
referendums (per capita) are included in the model. According to the rules in the Swiss cantons, a
mandatory (binding) fiscal referendum must be held if a spending project exceeds a pre-specified
amount. Only if the project is larger than such a threshold, the fiscal referendum can be binding.
The higher that amount the less restrictive fiscal referendums can be. A positive sign is thus ex-
pected for this variable. Moreover, the signature requirements for legislative initiatives (per cap-
ita) are included. The higher that signature requirement the more difficult it is to bring an initia-
tive to the ballots. The role of the initiative in the question of fiscal centralization is however less
clear-cut than that of the referendum. While the latter is a veto instrument, the initiative could be
used to change the status quo. With respect to fiscal centralization, this possibility implies that
initiatives could be started to centralize or to decentralize policies depending on the status quo.
The signature requirement could thus have a positive or a negative sign. If it turns out to be posi-
tive, the initiative restricts fiscal centralization. The initiative and the fiscal referendum are sub-
stitutes then. If it has a negative sign, the initiative is used to enhance the responsibilities of the
cantonal level. The initiative and the fiscal referendum are complements then.
The theoretical model implies that the expenditure (revenue) structure is a function of some in-
ternal determinants of a jurisdiction. First, the extent of fiscal federalism in the different jurisdic-
tions, measured by the vector Tit, plays an important role. According to  BESLEY and  COATE
(2003) and REDOANO and SCHARF (2004) centralization depends on preference heterogeneity at
the local level, but it could also result from tax competition or economies of scale in the provision
of government services (LOCKWOOD 2004). We capture homogeneity in a canton by solely rely-
ing on income differences. The spread of personal income is measured by the ratio of real taxable
income of the median taxpayer to that of the average taxpayer. The stronger the homogeneity of a
canton, the more reasonable it is to centralize government policies because of low preference– 25 –
costs. The closer the ideal points of the median voters in different local jurisdictions, the more
easily they can agree upon a uniform centralized provision of a public good.
A concurrent hypothesis with respect to that variable can be found in the literature on fiscal fed-
eralism according to which decentralized income redistribution is not possible due to income
stratification (FELD and SCHNEIDER, 2001). The more uneven income is distributed in a jurisdic-
tion, the more citizens may find it necessary to centralize income redistribution activities. The
higher the ratio of median to mean income, the more even the income distribution in a canton.
Following the normative theory of fiscal federalism, higher income differences are supposed to
increase the political pressure for centralization in particular with respect to spending and revenue
components which are strongly aimed at redistributing income, like e.g. (progressive) personal
income taxes or welfare spending. The homogeneity variable thus helps to find out the impor-
tance of both hypotheses. It is supposed to have a negative sign, if the traditional public finance
hypothesis on the impossibility of decentralized redistribution holds. If the political economy
argument holds, the homogeneity variable should have a positive sign.
Moreover, cantonal governments take fiscal policies of their neighbors into account when making
own decisions. This mimicking behavior of incumbents in a federalist system is either the result
of a tax competition game between the different jurisdictions, and thus their response to differen-
tial mobility of production factors (WILDASIN and WILSON, 2004)l, or a response of electoral
voting behavior since voters make inter-jurisdictional comparisons when making own decisions.
Consequently, incumbents are engaged in a kind of yardstick competition ( BESLEY and CASE,
1995). The extent of tax or yardstick competition is taken into consideration by a weighted aver-
age of the tax burdens of all other cantons for the highest income class. As weight, the inverse of
geographical distance is used. Three other control variables for the extent of fiscal federalism are– 26 –
included. Population, ratio of urban population and fragmentation (number of communes) cap-
ture (the lack of) economies of scale in consumption of publicly provided goods. Following the
argument by BRENNAN and BUCHANAN (1980), lump-sum grants from the central level constitute
an important resource for cantonal and local governments and therefore change the incentive
structure of fiscal federalism.
In addition to variables of fiscal federalism, we include a vector of economic, demographic and
political variables, Xit. The political control variables have to capture to what extent the common
pool argument might influence centralization. ROUBINI and SACHS (1989) argue that the broader a
coalition the weaker its budgetary discipline due to the common pool problem of the public
budget. Broad-based coalition governments on the cantonal level could have a tendency towards
policy centralization in order to satisfy a broader range of different constituencies. Therefore, a
coalition variable is included, measured by the number of parties in the cantonal cabinets. On the
other hand PEROTTI and KONTOPOULOS (2002) make use of the total number of ministers in the
cabinet as a proxy for common pool problems. Therefore, the number of cantonal ministers is
additionally included in the model. The severance of the common pool problem is mitigated by
fiscal federalism.
The remaining variables included in the model are standard controls. Real  cantonal income per
capita is used to find out whether more centralization is demanded in cantons with higher income.
The different cultural background is considered by adding a dummy-variable with respect to dif-
ferent language areas. With regard to different political preferences we include the variable ide-
ology that consists of an index within the range of 1 for right wing dominated and 5 for left-wing
dominated executive authority. Including these two variables is important, because they indicate
the preferences for government centralization in the different Swiss cantons. It may be that the– 27 –
degree of centralization as well as the inclusion of direct democratic decision-making rights in
the cantonal constitutions are both determined by a third variable. This third variable might be
fiscal preferences of the citizens in the different jurisdictions. In a recent paper,  PUJOL and
WEBER (2003) present evidence for Switzerland that fiscal preferences measured by fiscal refer-
endums at the federal level are nearly exclusively explained by the differences between the Swiss
language areas. In addition, partisan considerations may play a role. Therefore, we have to in-
clude both variables in the model. Finally, we include a dummy variable for the canton of Basle-
City in the model in order to consider the fact that state and local budgets are not properly distin-
guished in this canton.
In the spirit of other empirical investigations (e.g. FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER, 2001) our empirical
analysis is performed using a pooled cross-sectional time-series (TSCS) model including time
fixed effects. Although (cross section or two way) fixed effects models may be preferable as they
provide useful information about the longitudinal relationship, they do not seem to be appropriate
in our case. They leave the explanation of cross-canton differences to the cantonal intercepts
without any theoretical foundations and therefore capture a major part of the effect of fiscal refer-
endums since institutions do not or only slightly fluctuate over time. Thus, pooled models have to
be applied with care but can be regarded as reasonable in the field of institutionally oriented
comparative political economy. Following BESLEY and CASE (2003), we estimate the models by
OLS with robust standard errors. The results for state means are also (partly) reported. The esti-
mation of equations of the spending and revenue structure raises additional econometric issues.
Since the centralization ratios vary between zero and one and are therefore censored, they are
transformed to log odds. In addition, a careful analysis of outliers is undertaken. As can be seen
by the Jarque-Bera test in Table 2 this condition is violated with respect to most estimates. Thus,
we control for the outliers by including dummy variables for these observations. Comparing the– 28 –
estimation results with and without controlling for outliers indicates the extent of robustness of
the estimates.
Table 2: Log odds estimates for government centralization, general expenditure, revenue and tax
revenue, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Variable Expenditure I Expenditure II Revenue I Revenue II Tax revenue I Tax revenue II
-0.203*** -0.161*** -0.195*** -0.156*** -0.114 -0.133** Fiscal





























Homogeneity 0.195 0.069 0.157 0.029 0.599 0.026
(1.20) (0.60) (0.97) (0.27) (1.59) (0.46)
0.031** 0.033*** 0.030** 0.033*** 0.003 0.018*** Tax
competition (2.69) (3.01) (2.74) (3.05) (0.18) (2.81)
0.009* -0.097 0.072 -0.031 -0.216 -0.334*** Lump-sum grants
'
(0.05) (-0.62) (0.38) (-0.19) (-1.10) (-3.49)
-0.426 -0.122 -0.474* -0.175 -0.530 0.073 Ratio of urban
population (-1.64) (-0.65) (-1.89) (-0.97) (-1.35) (0.50)
Population
 “ -0.085 -0.057 -0.062 -0.037 0.037 0.046
(-0.73) (-0.41) (-0.53) (-0.27) (0.32) (0.44)
Fragmentation 
' -0.732 -0.526 -0.784* -0.579 -0.959** -0.610*













-0.353 -0.304 -0.382 -0.341 0.710 0.017 Cantonal
income 
' (-0.63) (-0.86) (-0.70) (-0.99) (0.89) (0.06)
Coalition 0.076* 0.010 0.072* 0.007 0.092 -0.012
(1.87) (0.39) (1.78) (0.26) (1.60) (-0.57)
Ideology -0.044 -0.047 -0.042 -0.045 -0.096 -0.081**
(-1.07) (-1.54) (-1.06) (-1.54) (-1.68) (-2.77)
Language -0.152 -0.220** -0.163 -0.225** -0.275 -0.165**
(-1.13) (-2.43) (-1.24) (-2.54) (-1.48) (-2.21)
1.568*** 1.542*** 1.605*** 1.577*** 1.452*** 1.279*** Dummy
Basel-Stadt (11.96) (14.28) (12.36) (14.64) (7.66) (16.85)
– 0.468*** – 0.457*** – 0.376*** Dummy Uri
(10.16) (10.18) (6.90)
– 0.336*** – 0.334*** – 0.970*** Dummy Glarus
(5.27) (5.38) (14.14)
– -0.025 – -0.020 – -0.006 Dummy
Uni-Kantone (-0.30) (-0.25) (-0.10)
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 0.852 0.912 0.856 0.914 0.770 0.950
Jarque-Bera 45.159*** 2.007 134.041*** 4.929* 126.238*** 0.006
Note: Government centralization stands for the state share of state and local expenditures. t-values are given in
parentheses. They are computed with robust standard errors according to the clustering method using STATA 7.0.
All regressions contain 19 year-dummies whose coefficients are not reported. ***,** and * indicate significance at






: scaled by 10^3, 10^5, 10^7, respectively for readability. The Jarque
Bera test statistic is a test on the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals.- 29 -
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Health Welfare Education Finance Traffic Economy Environment
-0.225 -0.050 0.078 -0.797*** -0.228** -0.216** -0.173 0.067 -0.223** -0.117 Fiscal













































Homogeneity 0.005 0.361* -0.031 0.510 0.304 0.405** -0.476* -0.182 -0.114 0.141
(0.05) (1.75) (-0.17) (0.85) (1.44) (2.63) (-1.74) (-0.80) (-0.30) (0.61)
Tax competition 0.029** 0.031** 0.010 0.234*** 0.031 0.060*** -0.026* -0.024 -0.035 0.042*
(2.14) (2.58) (0.48) (4.26) (1.26) (3.79) (-1.84) (-1.63) (-1.45) (1.94)
Lump-sum grants
' -0.022 -0.136 0.187 -2.477*** -0.227 0.084 -0.346 0.021 -0.148 0.583**
(-0.14) (-0.47) (0.75) (-3.37) (-0.76) (0.26) (-1.02) (0.09) (-0.35) (2.23)
-0.241 -0.091 0.219 -1.302 0.073 -0.111 -0.430 -0.263 0.910** 0.382 Ratio of urban
population (-1.03) (-0.28) (0.60) (-1.53) (0.18) (-0.29) (-1.00) (-1.06) (2.09) (0.83)
Population 
“ -0.100 -0.033 -0.194 -0.177 -0.359 0.358 0.100 0.078 -0.456 -0.022
(-0.58) (-0.17) (-0.93) (-0.25) (-1.38) (1.43) (0.49) (0.55) (-1.54) (-0.07)
Fragmentation 
' -0.245 -0.644 1.151** -5.363** 0.888 -0.350 -2.124*** -1.118** -0.004 0.006





















Coalition -0.038 -0.007 0.052 -0.086 -0.132** 0.081* 0.075 -0.001 0.009 -0.054
(-1.09) (-0.21) (1.22) (-0.61) (-2.29) (1.81) (1.42) (-0.02) (0.12) (-0.89)
Cantonal income 
' 0.439 -0.076 -0.753 2.903* 0.087 -0.823* -0.636 -0.115 -0.652 -0.823
(0.88) (-0.15) (0.99) (1.80) (0.11) (-1.84) (-0.67) (-0.16) (-0.83) (-0.97)
Ideology 0.003 -0.027 0.078 -0.401** 0.089 -0.037 -0.074 -0.034 -0.004 0.052
(0.07) (-0.47) (1.23) (-2.62) (1.24) (-0.54) (-0.99) (-0.92) (-0.05) (0.60)
Language -0.177 -0.277* -0.027 -0.692 -0.720*** -0.429* 0.265 -0.628*** 0.001 -0.416**
(-1.50) (-1.75) (-0.14) (-1.22) (-3.12) (-2.00) (0.96) (-4.17) (0.00) (-2.12)
1.229*** 2.242*** 1.963*** 0.469*** 1.426*** 1.409*** 1.167*** 1.314*** -0.456* 1.904*** Dummy
Basel-Stadt (9.29) (14.74) (8.83) (0.89) (5.72) (6.65) (5.03) (8.71) (-1.80) (7.99)
Controlling outliers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 0.814 0.871 0.765 0.722 0.794 0.828 0.596 0.711 0.576 0.767
For notes see Table 2.- 30 -
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Table 4: Log-odds estimates for government centralization, revenue structure, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998




Tax on income Tax on profits Tax on capital
-0.444*** -0.134** -0.085* -0.110** -0.486 -0.460 Fiscal





























Homogeneity 0.472** 0.021 0.072 0.039 -1.166 -1.249
(2.37) (0.31) (1.14) (0.62) (0.95) (-1.02)
Tax competition 0.082*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.024*** -0.194 -0.195
(3.34) (3.11) (3.35) (3.98) (-1.52) (-1.54)
Lump-sum grants
' -1.141** -0.312** -0.197* -0.339*** 2.857 2.937
(-2.78) (-2.81) (-1.90) (-3.38) (1.36) (1.41)
-0.851* 0.071 0.301* 0.317* -8.458* -8.447* Ratio of urban
population (-1.85) (0.47) (1.94) (2.08) (-1.95) (-1.96)
Population 
“ -0.115 0.054 -0.044 -0.031 3.618* 3.645*
(-0.33) (0.52) (-0.43) (-0.32) (1.80) (1.82)
Fragmentation 
' -1.972 -0.615* 0.007 -0.096 -17.015* -17.030*













Coalition 0.007 -0.016 -0.020 -0.016 -0.468 -0.484
(0.09) (-0.75) (-0.88) (-0.75) (-1.32) (-1.37)
Cantonal income 
' 1.704** 0.052 0.448 0.253 -3.085 -3.104
(2.17) (0.19) (1.64) (1.04) (-0.61) (-0.62)
Ideology -0.095 -0.084** -0.070** -0.057** -1.147* -1.171*
(-1.17) (-2.75) (-2.50) (-2.18) (-1.76) (-1.81)
Language -0.249 -0.163** -0.223** -0.201** 0.782 0.761
(-0.70) (-2.28) (-2.86) (-2.61) (0.52) (0.51)
1.274*** 1.284*** 8.790*** 0.878*** 4.167*** 10.947*** Dummy
Basel-Stadt (4.36) (17.15) (113.25) (11.79) (2.45) (6.45)
Controlling outliers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 0.767 0.935 0.997 0.945 0.550 0.756
For notes see Table 2.- 31 -
November 22, 2004
VI.  Results
In Tables 2 to 4, we report the results of the econometric model. We first present evidence on
total spending and revenue as well as tax revenue. Second, we extend the analysis to spending
and revenue structure. The regressions in Tables 2 to 4 indicate that the model performs relatively
well according to the R
2. The Jarque-Bera test statistics in Table 2 indicate that the hypothesis of
normality can be rejected for total spending, total revenue and tax revenue. It is interesting to
note that, in addition to the canton of Basle-City, the cantons of Uri and Glarus can be frequently
identified as outliers. Glarus is known for traditionally high levels of centralization from the local
to the cantonal levels. Uri obtains high amounts of grants from the federal government that the
cantonal government administers. Excluding the outliers from the regressions does not change the
main results. We thus proceed in Tables 3 and 4 by excluding the outliers from the beginning and
do not report the J.-B. test statistics anymore.
8
The results in Table 2 indicate that our theoretical considerations are confirmed for total revenue
and total spending. The dummy for fiscal referendums has the expected negative sign and is sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level. Cantons with fiscal referendums in their constitutions centralize
total spending and total revenue to a lesser extent to the cantonal level than those without fiscal
referendums. Cantons with fiscal referendums transfer a broader range of responsibilities to the
local level compared to cantons where solely representatives decide about policy centralization.
Looking at total expenditure and total revenue centralization, we thus find encouraging evidence
supporting Proposition 1. In the case of tax revenue, the fiscal referendum variable does not
prove to be significant. This is however mainly the case because of the very high centralization of
taxation in the canton of Glarus. Controlling for that outlier and in addition for the canton of Uri,
                                                                
8 They can be obtained from the authors upon request.- 32 -
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the fiscal referendum dummy becomes significant at the 1 percent level as well. The impact of
the fiscal referendum dummy on government centralization is in general robust to an analysis of
outliers and to the inclusion of a dummy variable for the cantons with universities. Its signifi-
cance is increased when outliers are taken into account and the size of the coefficient changes
somewhat.
The influence of fiscal referendums on fiscal centralization is further qualified by the estimates
on the spending threshold. As expected, the spending threshold has a positive impact and is sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level in the spending and revenue equations whether outliers are con-
trolled for or not. In the case of tax revenue, the control of outliers induces the spending threshold
to become significant at the 10 percent level. The higher the spending threshold and thus the less
restrictive the fiscal referendum, the more centralized is spending, revenue and tax revenue. Fi-
nally, the signature requirement for the legislative initiative does not have any significant impact
in any of the six equations presented in Table 2. As a further robustness check, we have estimated
the same models with between canton effects. This specification must be considered carefully
because there are only 26 Swiss cantons such that a degrees of freedom problem emerges. In sev-
eral variations the fiscal referendum dummy still proves to be significant at the 10 percent level at
least and keeps the negative sign. Fiscal referendums restrict fiscal centralization.
9
The same result holds, though to a lesser extent, with respect to the budgetary structure of gov-
ernment activities, as the results in Tables 3 (controlling for outliers and including the dummy
                                                                
9 Because of the degrees of freedom problem, the full model from Table 2 could not be used to estimate between
canton effects (canton means). These estimates are thus not explicitly shown in the paper. They can be obtained
from the authors upon request. – The estimates for the fiscal referendum dummy are 0.246 (t-statistic 1.85) for
spending, 0.235 (t-statistic 1.81) for revenue and 0.259 (t-statistic 2.17) for tax revenue.- 33 -
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variable for university cantons) indicate. On the expenditure side, fiscal referendums are associ-
ated with a significantly lower centralization in the case of spending for health, welfare, educa-
tion and the economy (including agricultural subsidies). Centralization of administration, secu-
rity, culture and recreation, finance and environmental expenditures are not significantly affected
by fiscal referendums. Since the spending categories where fiscal referendums have a restrictive
impact are the most important ones, it can be concluded that the fiscal referendum exerts the ex-
pected restrictive impact on policy centralization.
10 The spending threshold reaches conventional
significance levels only in the health, education and environmental spending equations. It has the
expected positive sign in these equations. The signature requirement for legislative initiatives has
an ambiguous impact on different spending categories. The higher the signature requirement (and
the less easy an initiative could make it to the ballots), the more centralized is education and
economy spending, the less centralized is however welfare spending. While the fiscal referendum
and the initiative are substitutes in the case of education and economic policy, they are comple-
ments in the case of social policy.
The results for the revenue structure in Table 4 (again controlling for outliers and university can-
tons) indicate that cantons allowing for a great extent of fiscal referendums are less centralized on
the cantonal level as far as user charges and the different kinds of taxes are concerned. The fiscal
referendum dummy has again the expected negative sign and is significant at the 1 percent level
in the case of centralization of user charges. It is significant at the 5 percent level with the ex-
pected negative sign in the case of centralization of income and property (wealth) taxes. The
property (wealth) tax component is only significantly influenced by the fiscal referendum at the
                                                                
10 Education spending covered about 22.8 percent of total cantonal and local spending followed by health spending
with 17.2 percent and welfare spending with 16.2 percent.- 34 -
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10 percent level. Profit and capital tax centralization are not significantly influenced by the fiscal
referendum. The spending threshold has the expected positive impact and is significant in the
same revenue categories as the fiscal referendum dummy. The signature requirement for the leg-
islative initiative does not have any significant influence on revenue centralization. Since the
most important indirect taxes, the VAT and the mineral oil tax, are in the power of the federal
government in Switzerland, we cannot say anything about centralization of indirect taxes. In ad-
dition, unimportant tax sources at the Swiss sub-federal level like car and dog taxes are not con-
sidered because they are usually centralized to the cantonal level. Finally, inheritance taxes are
not considered because they are (nearly) pure cantonal taxes as well. These results strongly sup-
port Proposition 1.
The control variables for the extent of fiscal federalism exhibit an interesting pattern. Most of
them are not significant in the equations or do not have a consistent impact across spending and
revenue structure. This already holds for homogeneity measured as the ratio of median to mean
income. It does not have any significant impact on the centralization of total spending, total reve-
nue or tax revenue whether outliers are controlled for or not (Table 2). As Tables 3 and 4 indi-
cate, a higher income homogeneity is significantly associated with more centralization in the case
of security and education expenditure as well as revenue from user charges, but with less cen-
tralization in the case of finance spending. All in all, income homogeneity does therefore not
have a consistent impact on centralization of government activities in Switzerland. These results
do neither support the traditional tax competition hypothesis that decentralized redistribution is
impossible, nor the argument that government activity can be centralized if tastes are homogene-
ous. On the other hand, the rather mixed results are not really surprising since important pro-
grams of income redistribution like the federal income tax and social security are centralized to- 35 -
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the federal level in Switzerland such that some arguments from the traditional theory of public
finance cannot be tested with the data used in this paper (FELD, 2000).
The coefficients of tax competition between Swiss cantons show that the better the situation of a
canton in the tax competition game, the more its government activities are centralized. Put differ-
ently, the stronger tax competition among cantons is, in the sense that the competing cantons set
their tax rates relatively low as compared to the canton considered, the more decentralized taxes
and spending are to the cantonal level. This holds for general revenue, tax revenue and general
spending (Table 2). With respect to the spending structure this decentralizing impact of tax com-
petition holds especially for administration, security, health, education, and environmental
spending whereas there is a centralizing impact in the case of finance spending (Table 3). With
respect to revenue structure, there is a robust, significant impact of tax competition on the decen-
tralization of user charges and the different kinds of tax revenue (Tables 4) with the exception
that the centralization of profit and capital taxes is not significantly influenced by tax competi-
tion. The more the other competing cantons increase their tax burden, the more taxes are central-
ized to the cantonal level. Cantons with a relatively bad situation in the tax competition game
shift taxes and spending to the local level in order to be bailed-out by their communities. This is a
rather short-sighted strategy given that income tax competition is more intense at the local than at
the cantonal level (FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER, 2001a).
Economies of scale do obviously not play an important and consistent role in the centralization
process at the Swiss cantonal level. The higher the share of urban population in the whole popu-
lation, the less centralized is total revenue (marginally significant at the 10 percent level) (Table
2), revenue from user charges, profits and capital tax revenue (Table 4), and the more centralized
is property (wealth) and income tax revenue as well economy expenditure (Table 3). Moreover,- 36 -
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the population size of the canton and fragmentation of a canton in many small communities do
not have consistent or robust impacts on centralization. Although there is a significantly negative
impact of the variable ‘geographical fragmentation’ on centralization of total revenue and tax
revenue, the impact of geographical fragmentation is not robust to the control of outliers and uni-
versity cantons in these cases. There are also very differentiated results depending on the spend-
ing and revenue category. Fragmentation is significantly positively affecting centralization of
culture and recreation spending as well as profit and capital tax revenue. It is however negatively
influencing the centralization of income and property (wealth) tax revenue as well as spending
for health, finance and traffic. This may indicate a trade-off. On the one hand, the impossibility of
exploiting economies of scale in the consumption of publicly provided goods for small jurisdic-
tions forces cantons to centralize a comparably broader range of government activities. On the
other hand, a higher number of local incumbents restricts the stability of vote trading for collu-
sion among jurisdictions and therefore leads to less policy centralization. As predicted by
BRENNAN and BUCHANAN (1980), grants-in-aid as an instrument for collusive agreements be-
tween governments weaken the power of fiscal federalism. The empirical evidence does not sup-
port this hypothesis in the Swiss case. The higher lump sum grants, the less centralized are the
different tax categories (Table 4) while there is only a marginally significant higher centralization
due to lump-sum grants in the case of total spending.
From the remaining control variables, the ministers and coalition variables are particularly inter-
esting. The higher the number of ministers, the higher is centralization of government activity.
This holds for total spending and revenue centralization (significant at the 1 percent level) as well
as for tax revenue (significant at the 10 percent level), but also for user charges, taxes on income
and property (wealth), in particular income taxes, as well as security, health, education, finance,
economy and environmental expenditure. Aside the fiscal referendum dummy and the tax com-- 37 -
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petition variable, this is thus the variable with the most consistent impact on fiscal policy cen-
tralization in the Swiss cantons. As assumed in the theoretical model, the common pool problem
induced by a higher number of ministers in the cabinet provides incentives for fiscal policy cen-
tralization in order to secure the political rents captured. The more parties are represented in the
cantonal cabinets, the stronger spending and revenue centralization are supposed to be. This re-
sult does however not consistently and robustly hold for total spending or revenue or for the
spending and revenue categories. In most cases this variable is not significant.
The remaining control variables, ideology, language and cantonal income do not exhibit consis-
tent and clear-cut impacts on centralization of different tax categories as well as general revenue.
They are mostly insignificant. Only in the case of the revenue categories, it can be concluded that
cantons with leftist governments have less centralization for most of the tax revenue categories.
VII.  Conclusions
In this paper, the first empirical test is performed as to whether fiscal referendums prevent cen-
tralization of government activity. On the basis of a theoretical model in the spirit of BESLEY and
COATE (2003), we have shown that the degree of centralization is lower under direct than under
representative democracy. If spillovers of public goods between two jurisdictions exist and indi-
vidual preferences in the jurisdictions are sufficiently homogeneous, citizens have incentives to
centralize policies. Compared to elected representatives, centralization is however lower under
direct democracy because the common pool problem is more severe in representative democracy
and it is likely that representatives extract political rents. This is anticipated by the voters. With
direct democratic institutions on the central level, implying non-cooperative decision-making,
voters face additional uncertainty, not knowing precisely ex ante which position the median voter
will have in the newly shaped electorate. In a representative system, the uncertainty about the- 38 -
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outcome of the centralized political process can be reduced, for instance by gerrymandering. Both
arguments together imply that centralization is more likely to be agreed upon by local represen-
tatives compared to local median voters.
Based on the predictions of this model, we have conducted an econometric analysis of the cen-
tralization of spending and revenue using panel data of Swiss cantons for the period 1980 to
1998. Our results broadly support the hypothesis that fiscal referendums restrict the ability to
centralize government activities. This does not only hold with respect to the centralization of
revenue and spending in general, but also to several spending and revenue categories. In addition
to the referendum, fiscal federalism plays a role, although the impact of different proxies for the
extent of fiscal federalism is heterogeneous. For example the less comfortable the position of a
canton in the tax competition game with other cantons, the more government activities are de-
centralized to the cantonal level.
From a positive perspective, referendums are associated with less centralization of government
activities. This does however not imply any particular normative interpretation. The models of
REDOANO and SCHARF (2004) or LOCKWOOD (2004) for example start from the perspective that
centralization is useful due to inter-jurisdictional externalities or economies of scale while
BESLEY and COATE (2003) and PERSSON and TABELLINI (2000) underline the negative effects of
political failures. In fact, centralization might be a consequence of political failure, if representa-
tives at the central level have a vested interest in centralization to obtain personal rents or secur-
ing re-election. Then referendums serve to safeguard the proper interests of sub-ordinate jurisdic-
tions. The results in this paper do not help to solve this normative discussion. This must be left to
future research.- 39 -
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2.
In a first step, we will show that for  , 1 = p  centralization is preferred for any level of spillovers.
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For any  ( ] ¥ ˛ , 1 z  the right hand side never assumes a value higher than ½. The inequality is al-
ways true and for  , 0 = g  centralization will always be preferred if  . 1 = p  Concerning other values
of  , g  there is a complication as far as the benefits of centralization are not necessarily strictly
monotonously rising with  . g  Let
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which, given the first order conditions, is necessarily positive. On the other hand,
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which, after inserting the first order condition, can be written as




















Because the difference between the first two terms will be negative for small g  and because, as
can be inferred from the first order conditions,  ( ) g
Nm
j g  is either convex with a relatively flat slope- 45 -
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for small values of  , g  or linear,  v may be declining in an interval  ( ] g , 0  and rises monotonously
thereafter.
With  ( ) g v  being convex,  ( ) g w  rising strictly monotonously and  ( ) ( ) 0 0 w v >  as well as
( ) ( ), 1 1 w v >  it is a necessary condition for  ( ) ( ) g g w v <  at any  ( ) 1 , 0 ˛ g  that  ( ) ( ) g g ˆ ˆ w v <  with  gˆ
being exactly that value of  , g  where the slopes of  w and  v are identical. Equating both partial
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which is always the case, since once again the left hand side is the slope of the secant and can,
due to our first order conditions, not be smaller than ½. Therefore, for  , 1 = p  centralization is
preferred irrespective of the degree of spillovers.
The next step is to show that even for  , 0 = p  it is possible that centralization is preferred. For this
purpose, it is sufficient to look at (9), where it is obvious that with  , 1 = g  the left hand side of the
inequality assumes the same value at  0 = p  and at  . 1 = p  Therefore, the argument that has been
made for  1 , 1 = = g p  is also valid for  . 1 , 0 = = g p- 46 -
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Proof of Lemma 4.
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Let  ( ) s a  denote the slope of the secant between 
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i g  in the direct democracy case (i.e.,
the left hand side of (8)), and  ( ) s ß  denote the slope of the secant between 
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whereas in a representative democracy,
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s > > ß (26)
warrants centralization. With  , 1 = s  the first order conditions for the public goods levels are
identical and so are the threshold spillover levels  . 1 3
* * =g g  Due to the strict concavity of  () ￿ b  and
the first order conditions for the optimal spending levels, it is necessarily true that for all
[ ) ( ) ( ). , 1 , 0 s s a s ß > ˛- 47 -
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For the threshold spillover levels from where centralization is preferred, we know that 
* * > 3 1 g g
holds if








( ) ( ). s sa s > ￿ ß (28)
From this it follows that if  s  is sufficiently small,  s s <  with  ( ) ( ), / s a s s ß =  then 
* * < 1 3 g g
holds. Since both  ( ) s a  and  ( ) s ß  converge to the same limit with  , 0 ﬁ s  there has to exist
some  0 > s  for which the above inequality holds.
It is easily checked that for some specifications of  ( ), g b  such as  ( )
a g a g b ￿ =  with
1 , 1 0 , 0 = < < > s a a  holds, because in this case,  ( ) s sa  is convex with  ( ) ( ) 1 1 ß = a  and
( ) 0 lim
0 =
ﬁ s sa
s  and  ( ) s ß  is concave or linear with  ( ) . 0 lim
0 =
ﬁ s
s ß- 48 -
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Appendix B
Table A1: Data description
Variable name Description Source
Structure of
Revenue share
Real total cantonal revenue per capita as a
share of real cantonal and local revenue per
capita.
Own calculations on the basis of the
Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Structure of
Expenditure share
Real total cantonal spending per capita as a
share of real cantonal and local spending per
capita.
Own calculations on the basis of the
Swiss Federal Finance and Tax Ad-
ministration
Fiscal Referendum Dummy variable = 1, if a mandatory fiscal
referendum exists, and zero otherwise.
Lutz and Strohmann (1998) and
Trechsel and Serdült (1999).
Spending Threshold Spending threshold for mandatory fiscal refer-
endums in the case of non-recurring expendi-
tures per capita.
Lutz and Strohmann (1998) and
Trechsel and Serdült (1999).
Signature require-
ment
Number of signatures that need to be collected
for a legislative initiative per capita of the
electorate.
Lutz and Strohmann (1998) and
Trechsel and Serdült (1999).
Homogeneity Ratio between the real personal income of the
median taxpayer compared to the average tax-
payer
Own calculations on the basis of the
Swiss Federal Tax Administration
Tax competition Weighted average of the tax burdens of all
other cantons for the highest income class;
Weight: Inverse of geographical distance.
Own calculations on the basis of data
from the Swiss Federal Tax Admini-
stration
Lump-sum grants Real federal lump-sum grants per capita Own calculations on the basis of the
Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Ratio of urban
population
Proportion of communes having more than
10'000 inhabitants.
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Population Cantonal population Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Fragmentation Number of communes in a canton Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Minister Number of ministers in cabinet Own calculations on the basis of data
from the cantonal governments.
Coalition Number of parties in cabinet. Own calculations on the basis of data
from the cantonal governments.
Cantonal income Real cantonal income per capita Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Ideology Index between 1 (right) to 5 (left) that meas-
ures the relative strength of parties in govern-
ment with reference to the Left-Right dimen-
sion.
Own calculations on the basis of data
from the cantonal governments.
Language Dummy=1 for German speaking cantons Own calculations- 49 -
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Appendix C
Table A2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
General Revenue 67.0% 10.7% 50.5% 99.8%
User Charges 47.5% 22.4% 7.4% 99.2%
Tax Revenues 56.9% 13.2% 20.9% 97.7%
Tax on expenditure 97.0% 3.4% 76.1% 100%
Tax on income and property
(wealth) 54.7% 14.0% 24.6% 97.9%
Tax on property
(wealth)
51.4% 14.9% 18.7% 100%
Tax on income 51.1% 13.8% 26.4% 93.9%
Tax on profit 55.5% 17.7% 13.5% 100%
Tax on capital 55.1% 18.0% 19.8% 100%
Tax on inheritance 91.3% 0.2% 44.5% 100%
General Expenditure 66.9% 10.8% 51.0% 99.6%
Administration 49.0% 13.1% 26.2% 94.7%
Security 75.7% 11.1% 11.0% 99.9%
Culture and Recreation 34.7% 18.9% 8.0% 97.8%
Health 70.2% 24.8% 10.0% 100%
Public Welfare 73.1% 15.5% 39.8% 99.7%
Education 64.2% 18.1% 50.5% 99.7%
Finance 67.1% 17.5% 17.9% 99.9%
Traffic 69.5% 13.6% 33.5% 98.7%
Economy 84.0% 12.6% 42.9% 99.9%
Environment 35.0% 20.9% 7.2% 98.9%
Fiscal referendum 0.69 0.46 0 1
Spending threshold 12.01 17.28 0 84.91
Signature requirement 0.015 0.011 0.038 0.002
Homogeneity 83.5% 7.3% 65.5% 99.7%
Tax competition 0.237 0.08 0.098 0.419
Lump-sum grants 1099 688 328 4152
Ratio of urban population 30.6% 24.4% 0.0% 99.5%
Population 258’519 271’073 12’757 1'183’568
Fragmentation 115.5 113.9 3 412
Ministers 6.39 1.22 5 9
Coalition 3.3 0.9 1 5
Ideology 3.3 0.7 2 5
Cantonal income 25.9 5.8 17.7 54.0
Language 73.1% 44.4% 0.0% 100%
Note:
For a detailed description of the variables see Appendix B.
All statistics are computed for 494 observations.
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